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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditional Development Economics defines economic development in the view of transferring 
rural surplus labor force. It implies the industrialization is in a static state at a certain level while it 
is in a process of continuous industrial upgrade in reality. Under the circumstances, we analyze 
phenomenon followed by the upgrading of industrial structure such as return migration and 
mid-aged rural labors’ difficulty in job-hunting and demonstrated the influence of land 
centralization based on the practice of industrial upgrade and rural change in Suzhou. Finally it 
come to the conclusion that because of the extensive competition on simple-labor market, the 
industrial upgrade will make a adverse employment shock upon mid-aged rural labor which will 
lead to the more uncertainty of peasants to get jobs in the industrial section . If government takes 
an improper policy of land centralization, peasants will lose guarantee in the future and resist the 
land centralization. After the comparison between one-off compensation and land cooperation, a 
further demonstration show that the method of one-off compensation will depress peasants’ 
enthusiasm in land centralization while the form of land cooperation can guarantee and promote 
peasants’ welfare under the given institution of land ownership. As a result, land cooperation 
allows the smooth operation of land centralization and supports the industrial upgrade to some 
extent. 
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1. Motivation 
For quite a long period, Traditional Developing Economics believes that the transfer of rural labor 
into the industrial section is the only way to balance the economic development in urban and rural 
areas. Zhang Peigang mentioned in Agriculture and industrialization , his creative works of 
Developing Economics, rural labor will not always stand in a static state on farms but part of it 
will transfer into factories to engage in industrial production（Chang，1949）. Later, Lewis 
established the Dual-Sector Model（Lewis，1954）to elaborate that the transfer of rural labor is an 
imperative and pointed out the essence of economic development is structure transition from 
traditional department into modern industry, which mainly referring to the transfer of rural surplus 
labor into modern sections. Heading for the goal of transferring into industrial sections, 
Harris-Todaro Model（Harris , Todaro，1970）converted the idea of industrial section to urban 
section (they assume the industrial section only exist in the cities) .Thereafter the model has 
become classic in the research of labor transfer. So later it has become a topical subject of 
economic development research that rural surplus labor departing from agriculture to balance the 
agriculture and industry, the so-called Dual-Economic Structure in cities and countryside. 
However, if we have a retrospect at the development of developed areas in China, the transfer 
of rural surplus labor is not so theoretical. The process of economic development should not be 
simply regarded as the transfer of simple labor from rural areas to stay immobile in the industrial 
or non-agricultural section. During our research on the current urbanization, industrial upgrade 
and new rural construction in Suzhou, we found that after the requisition of rural land in the 
process of urbanization and industrialization, the phenomenon of difficulty in job-hunting has 
arisen in the transfer of rural labor. Those who are mid-aged rural labor find themselves hard to 
get a job in the industrial section after rendering their land, since the section requires labor skill 
training. On the other hand, some township enterprises which established long ago are now facing 
the pressure of upgrading and competition, among which not a small amount of mid-aged rural 
labor have lost their jobs and are facing the pressure of re-employment. The two phenomena 
reveal that economic development is not simply counting on the transfer of rural labor into 
industrial section and urban section. We can tell that the transfer of rural labor from different age 
groups have their unique characteristics ,especially at the current stage, the focus is put on the 
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realization of enhancing industrial level, which is also known as the industrial upgrades. It 
requires higher demand on labor skills, which cause the large amount of rural labor especially the 
mid-aged simple labor, can not adjust themselves to the labor with high-skill required by the 
industrial upgrades and face the threat of deadlock or unemployment. Meanwhile, the expansion 
of industrial and urban scale requires more and more rural land. Then a conflict appears that while 
mid-aged peasants have difficulty in job hunting and even face the crisis of losing their jobs, the 
dispersing lands are centralized and dedicated to industrial sections and urban sections. Even if 
these peasants have changed into citizens, their rights of development are critically restricted. We 
are glad to notice that new models are turning up in Suzhou in order to realize the peasants’ rights 
of rural land, such as land cooperation, community cooperation and real estate cooperation. All of 
them entitle peasants to share part of the profits from assets return brought by industrialization and 
urbanization based on the land they own, which to some extent release the peasants’ pressure of 
job-hunting. (Zheng Jianghuai etc. 2007)  
Through analysis on the new phenomenon along with the economic development, we realized 
that the process of economic development described by modern development economics is far too 
abstract. It implies that industrialization relies on certain technology skills or it could be simply 
regarded as a sufficient condition in the employment expansion of rural labor (Yao Yang, 1999), 
which ignore the fact that adverse shock and difference in structure demand of transferred rural 
labor by continuous industrial upgrade. Since the mid-aged rural labor face the pressure of 
job-hunting and unemployment and return to the rural area, the centralization of land in the form 
of land cooperation has increased peasants’ income and feasible ability, which has not gained 
enough attention by modern development economics. However, it is our main focus and will be 
elaborated in the following part. 
Recent researches about the backflow of Chinese peasants are focusing on the concluding and 
testing For example, Hare believed the key factors of labor transfer-out and backflow in China are 
different. The urban admittance system made ingoing peasants face certain kind of risk. 
Meanwhile the immature factor market at transfer-out location also restrict labors transfer into 
urban sections, which lead to the peasants’ back and comutation in sections and districts
（Hare,1999）. Zhao Yaohui analyzed the data of rural families in six provinces of China between 
August and September in 1999, and gave the conclusion that the factors influencing the peasant’s 
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transfer plans include the unstable condition of land ownership, urban admittance system, spouse 
leaving for job-hunting in other big cities, the proportion of adult labor in a family and the 
development of none-agriculture section in rural areas（Zhao，1999，2002）. Besides, the respective 
analysis on labor transfer of different types are prevalent in references (Vanderkamp,1971; Kau 
and Sirmans,1976），we distinguish young rural labor and mid-aged rural labor according to ages, 
as the classification made by Wu Zhongming(2003). According to Pang Lihua(2003)’s research on 
senior labor supply in rural area, the percentage of peasants aged from 50 to 59 who take part in 
agricultural production reaches 90%. The research also demonstrated the annual work hours of 
senior peasants in the none-agriculture section reaches 1400h, which strongly reveals that peasants 
aged from 40 to 60 can still join in various production activities. Considering land function and 
circulation, Hare (1999) regarded that under the situation that peasants can not enjoyed the 
registered permanent residence in cities, the land ownership is the only source which provide 
peasants with income and social welfare simultaneously. In the process of land circulation, 
government expropriated land by force and low compensation. However, the compensation can  
not be measured in the standard of market price but the standard to afford current basic living. 
Wang Xiaoying(2006) did research on distribution of expropriated land in rural areas, and the 
average compensation in Kunshang District of Suzhou is 28.9 yuan per square meter ,which 
accounts for 15.9% of market price. 
Compared to these researches, our work is based on Zheng Jianghuai’s research (2007) on the 
weakening or even losing of feasible ability of rural labor on the background of industrial upgrade 
in Suzhou, the developed districts in east china. Our work also elaborated how the adverse shock 
affects rural labor of different ages. And he pointed out that compared to young peasants, the main 
weakness of mid-aged peasants lies in the physical part and expected rate of return. That is to say, 
if the human resource and skills have not enhanced after transferring into industrial section and 
urban section, it will definitely shadow economic development by the successful transfer of rural 
surplus labor. Because of factors of land contract system and lack of land, return migration can not 
get high enough agricultural profit .Since they can not get enough compensation in the 
centralization and transfer of land, the development of rural labor will be in a dilemma. Once it is 
predicable, it will hinder the centralization of land and hinder the industrial upgrade as well as the 
urbanization afterwards. Based on the idea, our thesis further improved that land cooperation 
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operating in the developed district as Suzhou will release the dilemma of that part of rural labor 
and support the upgrading of industrial structure and urbanization to some extent.  
The frame of this paper is as below. The 2nd section elaborates how industrial upgrade make the 
adverse shock on mid-aged rural labor .The 3rd section is divided into two parts. The first part 
discusses the influence of the adverse shock on mid-aged rural labor under one-off compensation 
condition, which hinders the land centralization. The other part mainly focuses on how the land 
cooperation release the impact of adverse shock and support land centralization. The last section is 
a conclusion. 
 
2. The adverse employment shock 
The opening china is becoming the center of the international manufacturing industry. A flood 
of foreign companies has established manufacturing factories in china, which in fact has attracted 
large amount of rural labors’ employment. However, what foreign companies value is the domestic 
cheap labor, raw material and energy supply, along with the main investment focus still set on the 
low-value-added processing and assembling sections. In this way, most of the profits are gain by 
foreign enterprises who own the core technology and international brand. Compared to the above, 
the profits gained by the domestic investors, labors and government are comparatively low, and 
the international competitive ability is still rather weak. 
In order to solve the problem, lots of developed district have set their next goals to realize the 
upgrade of modern manufacturing, as a surpass strategy it will definitely have an impact on the 
employment of rural labor in the industrial section. The object of our study is the group of 
mid-aged peasants in the developed districts, who are generally not well educated and physically 
weaker than before. However, they can still provide certain kind of labor. We will use a company 
employment model to describe how the industrial upgrade has an employment impact on the 
mid-aged rural labor. Two hypotheses exist in the model: (1) the difference in age determines the 
difference in physical labor supplied (2) the industrial upgrade inside companies are driven by 
endogenous reason (company’s pursuit to profits) and exogenous reason (government’s pursuit to 
GDP and taxation )  
First , assume three factors are demanded by the company production process, physical labor 
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as ， mental input as and capital as ln1 tn2 K . The hired physical labor is all from rural 
workers. With generally low education and insufficient training of skills, rural workers can only 
provide simply physical labor. represents the amount of labor provided per physical worker，b 
represents age of physical workers. Since the age of 40 is a threshold of turning into mid-aged, we 
set it as a dividing line. We can get: 
l
           且                                   （1）    =)(bl
1
2
2 0 4 0
4 0 6 0
l b
l b
≤ <
≤ ≤
⎧⎨⎩ 21 ll ≥
It implies each young physical worker offers more labor than that each mid-aged physical 
worker offers. When b equals, all the labor offered by physical works are of same property, 
represents the amount of physical worker hired by companies， represents the amount of 
mental workers hired by the companies，  represents the amount of mental input per mental 
worker and 
1n 2n
t
−
K  represents the capital amount used by the enterprises, we assume it as a fixed 
value. The production function of the enterprise is  which satisfies .),),(( 21
−
Ktnblnf 1 2, 0,f f ≥ 11,f  
. 22 120, 0f f≤ ≥
The production price P depends on , the value-added of production. The production price 
will be higher if the volume of  increases, with . In this point of view, the 
goal of industrial upgrade is to produce high value-added products and gain more profits. 
Meanwhile, the add value of productions is influenced by the technology of enterprises and 
intellectual capital. The add value will be higher if the amount of mental work devoted into R&D 
increases. Here we assume the add value is only influenced by the total amount of mental works, 
as . Meanwhile, the add value of production also represents the rank of the industry, 
and we assume , that is to say we assume the mental input by industrial rank is 
degree of one.  
a
a 0(*),0(*) "' ≤≥ PP
)( 2tnaa =
0,0 "' =≥ aa
At present，the industrial upgrade in many areas is directed by the local government. On one 
hand, it is beneficial to increase the local government fiscal through enhancing the profits of local 
enterprises. On the other hand, it is also an important index for the upper government to assess the 
local official. According to the model, the local governments are propelling the industrial upgrade 
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through providing them with allowance of  per mental labor. The activities of enterprises are   
restricted by the budget. We assume the wage of mental workers is higher than that of physical 
workers,
s
1 2 ,0 1w wσ σ= < <  and we also set 2w w= . Then the budget constraint of 
enterprises can be written as 1 2n w n w Mσ + ≤ 。 
  Then the maximization problem of the enterprise is:  
=π
21 ,nn
Max ),),(( 21
−
Ktnblnf *                                 )]([ 2tnaP tsn2+
s.t.  1 2n w n w Mσ + ≤ ；                                  （2） 0, 21 ≥nn
and the FOC is 
                  '1 2( ) [ ( )] 0f l b P a n t wλσ− =                                 
（3） 
                 2 2[ ( )] P ( )a (f tP a n t f+ ⋅ ⋅' ' ' )t+st- w 0λ =                               （4） 
combine (3) and (4) and simplify, we have 
' '
1 ' ' 2
1 2
2
( ) [ ( )] ( )( ) 0
[ ( )]
f p a n t a t stf l b f t
P a n t
σ − ⋅ ⋅ +− − =                            
（5）
cern is the im ent amount of mid-aged 
peasants. Derivate with respect to 
 
What we con pact of industrial upgrade on employm
)(1 bln=Ω  ( )a ⋅  and we get: 
0≥∂a                                          （6）   
 (see appendix 1), formula (6) manifested that the industrial upgrade is asking for more labor in 
the phy l section. Combining e production func  of enterprises and formula (1), we can 
1
of 2l  will be replaced by 1l . According to the definition of the average labor amount of two 
different age groups defined by (1), if all the workers are at the age between 40 and 60 , when the 
Ω∂
sica th tion
find if  is fixed,① demand of  will increase as increase, then inevitable part or even all 
industrial upgrade occurs, the employer will definitely fire part of the employees and hire the 
                                                       
n l  ln1  
 
① The invariability of  is due to the fact that if the employer pays no cost in firing workers, and wage is paid 
by worker number exogenously, it is cost-efficient for the employer to employ  young workers rather mid-age 
workers. And it is also preferable to employ  young workers considering the future training expense. 
1n
1n
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young works at the age group[20，40 )  , who can offer more labor. Then we can reach the 
proposition below： 
 
Proposition 1: when the enterprises are in the process of industrial upgrade, and if the 
amount of hired labor is fixed, part or all of the mid-aged workers will be replaced by young 
workers, namely the adverse shock of industrial upgrade on mid-aged peasants (simple 
physical workers). 
 
The model reveals that the industrial upgrade(the increase of add value ( )a ⋅ ) will increase the 
production price .This incentive of profits will encourage companies to devote more mental 
labor , and the increase of mental labor will ask for more physical labor to coordinate. 
From formula (3), it can be seen that when the mental labor increases, with the wage  as a 
constant, the marginal production of physical works will exceed the marginal cost, which makes 
companies put into more physical labor. The reasons lead to industrial upgrade could be  
distinguished as market reason and government reason. If the creative competition is fierce in the 
market with new products coming out, it will lead to the fall of , as industrial rank, of certain 
companies’ mental labor input . If companies want to keep the current profit level, the 
feasible way is to enhance the input of mental labor. Besides，the model of government-leading 
will become more and more important. Based on what evaluated above, government has incentive 
to encourage enterprises to industrial upgrade and to give subsidy to R&D activities of enterprises.                  
p
tn2 ln1
ln1 w
a
∗)( 2tn
According to formula (6), we can get the inequality based on the same reason: 
0Ω ≥∂
∂
s
                                      （7）           
The formula (7) demonstrated that the increase of government subsidy into the process of 
industrial upgrade will lead the enterprise to devote more mental labor, and also physical labor. it 
will squeeze out the mid-aged workers from the market, that is 2 0n
s
∂ ∂Ω ≤∂Ω ∂
. 
 
Proposition 2: Under the circumstance that government enhances subsidy in the process of 
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industrial upgrade, if the amount of physical worker hired by the enterprises is fixed, it will 
lead to more input of physical labor and squeeze part or all of mid-aged peasants out of the 
market.①
 
The mechanism of Proposition 2 is as same as Proposition 1, though the incentive of industrial 
upgrade do not again based on the market price but subsidy offered by the government. Besides, in 
this model, we treat peasant workers as pure physical workers in a static state. In fact, through 
skill trainings, peasants can offer certain amount of mental works or complex works. And 
obviously, it is more worthy for the enterprise to train the young peasant than the middle-age ones 
because of the longer period of return. That is why on the background of industrial upgrade, the 
development of industrialization might form an adverse employment shock on mid-aged rural 
labor. In our opinion, to realize the difference in the age structure will change the view held by 
traditional development economics that economic development will certainly propel the peasant 
employment. 
 
3. Method to Release the Shock   
The developed districts as Szuhou are launching land centralization to meet the demand of 
industrialization and civilization. However, the inappropriate way to centralize land will easily 
cost the benefit conflicts between peasants and the government. Recently, the models of 
centralizing land are known as government expropriating land, land leasehold and land 
cooperation. Inspired by the model of Yao Yang （Yao, 1999）, We are developing the model of a 
peasant household to analyze how peasant arrange the production factors when facing the adverse 
employment shock. In the model in 3.1, we assume government can buy land from peasants in the 
form of one-off compensation but still they can not force peasants to sell the land, therefore we 
can make clear the true attitude of peasants towards land centralization. We will add the factor of 
land cooperation in model 3.2 
                                                        
① Some recent work prove our viewpoints indirectly. For example, Zhao (2002) showed once the age increase by 
10 years based on 30.9, the return rate will raise by 9.8 percent. This conclusion proves one of our viewpoints 
empirically, namely that peasant begin to return to their hometown after 40. 
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3.1 One-Off Compensation 
Assume there are two stages, at the first the peasants are around the age group [20，40], they begin 
to arrange their initial resource .Between stage one and stage two, according to the local industrial 
upgrade, adverse shock on peasants is brought up by the industrial section, which lead to the dim 
prospect of the  peasant in labor market. The shock is revealed by the amount of peasants hired 
by the enterprises. Known from the adverse shock model above, the target of the impact is mainly 
mid-aged peasants who are above 40 and whose energy is weaker than before. According to the 
fact that it is more supply than demand in the industrial section in developed areas in China, we 
can come to the conclusion that the labor supplied by peasants is as a quota, , which implies the 
activities of peasants can not influence the labor demand of enterprises. In the first stage, 
enterprise provide work positions as , the expected employment amount of peasant at the 
second stage is ， in which 
−
L
w
L1
−
θ−= −−
ww
LL 12 θ  is a random variable representing the adverse 
employment shock on peasants along with the industrial upgrade. That is why θ  is non-negative. 
On the range , the probability density is ],0[ 1
w
L
−
)|( εθφ ，condition parameter ε  represents the 
scale of industrial upgrade. Since we have known scale of industrial upgrading is forming an 
adverse employment shock on the peasants, namely 0/)|( ≤∂Φ∂ εεθ , Φ  is the cumulative 
distribution function of θ . At the second stage，peasants’ ages are around 40 to 60，the adverse 
employment shock has taken place, he can only arrange the rest of his resource. 
Assume the initial endowment of peasant is the amount of labor ，amount of undertaking 
land 
−
L
−
T . In the form of one-off compensation, peasant families have three income resources. One 
is the agricultural income from own land , the production function is ，among which  
and 
),( LTF T
L  represent the input land and labor respectively. The second is the wage income from 
industrial section，the exogenous wage of industrial section is w；the third is the one-off 
compensation by transferring land，with the price per unit of br . Because of the immature rural 
land market，the transaction cost existing in the transferring is , the one-off compensation from bc
 11
transferring amount bT of land then is . )( bbb crT −
We use Cobb-Douglas Production Function =),( LTF βα LT  to describe the agricultural 
production. To ensure the concave of function, we assume 1<α , 1<β . Many papers regard the 
agricultural production as decreasing return to scale, so we assume 1<+ βα 。Then the 
peasant’s problem in the first stage is： 
π
wbff LTTL
Max
1111 ,,,
=           )]([)()()( 1
*
21111
bbbbwff TEcrTwLLT πμβα +−++
         s.t   ； ； ；             （8）    −=+ LLL wf 11
−=+ TTT bf 11
_
11
ww LL ≤ 0,,, 1111 ≥bfwf TTLL
Among the above， represent respective, in the first stage, the labor amount used in 
the agriculture production, in the industrial production and the land amount used in the 
agricultural and the one-off compensation . 
bfwf TTLL 1111 ,,,
μ  is the discount factor and 1<μ .  is the 
optimal value function of peasant income in the second stage. Assume the optimum interior 
solution exists，we can get the FOD as below： 
*
2π
                                                      (9) 0)()( 111 =−− wLT ff βαβ
                0)]([)()()(
1
1
*
2
1
1
1 =∂
∂+−+−− −− b
b
bbfb
T
TEcrLTT πμα βα                  (10) 
 
Formula（9）explains peasants will get marginal benefit from agricultural production equal to the 
wage from the enterprises. Formula（10） demonstrated that the current loss and expected loss in 
the agricultural production should be compensated by the one-off compensation. The second first 
order condition is crucial, which demonstrates peasants’ attitude to land transfer do not only 
depend on present profit but also the future profit. Because of the low one-off compensation，the 
voluntarily transferred land is few or even none. This is the main reason why developed districts 
find it hard to expand agricultural production into large scale.  We can regard the third item of 
formula (10) as the shadow price of land transfer . Of course，the shadow price must be 
negative. According to formula（10），the land amount of the is the Increasing Function of 
shadow price ，namely 
2P
bT1
2P
 12
                     1
2
0
bT
P
∂ >∂
                                         （11） 
In reality, the types of land transfer varies from transferring land into large-scale cultivation 
undertaken by rich families, transferring land seasonally to other peasants, to government 
expropriating land, land centralization for building factories leaded by government as well as 
land shares system. Among the above, some types are originated by the administrative order from 
government department and can not be solved by peasants themselves. To simply the analysis, 
we only use the land voluntarily transferred to represent all the situations. The reason why 
peasants would like to sell the land is to balance the marginal value of work income and 
agricultural income at the hypothesis that the chances of factory employment and compensation 
exist. It is different from the type of land leasehold. To illustrate the one-off compensation, at the 
second stage we assume peasants can not get follow-up income from the first stage. 
The shadow price of land transfer at the first stage depends on peasants’ income from the 
second stage. Assume when peasants entering the older age group [40，60]，they won’t transfer 
land any more but distribute labor in different production use, which will not effect our conclusion. 
Before the second stage starts, adverse employment shock occurs. To all the peasants, the impact 
will deduce their hiring possibility in factories. Under the condition of adverse employment 
shock，the choice of peasants in the second stage is  
wfb
LL
wLLTTMax
wf 2212,
)()(
22
+−= − βαπ                            (12) 
s.t        ；  ；  
−=+ LLL wf 22
_
22
ww LL ≤ 0, 22 ≥wf LL
then Kuhn-Tucker Condition is  
           ；               （13） 0)()( 121 =−+−−− −
−− λβ βα wLLTT wb 0)( 22 ≥−
−
w
w
LLλ
that is to say the optimal agricultural labor must make the marginal revenue from agriculture equal 
to the wage. Replace  in formula（13）by  . From formula（13）it can be concluded 
that when 
wL2 *2 )(
wL
0>λ ， . The realistic explanation of this situation is that enterprises 
are providing wage much higher than the agricultural income. That’s why peasants are so eager to 
enter the industrial section，and if they can get a fulltime job they can abort all the agricultural 
activities on land. It can be described in Mathematics way as . 
0)( *2
_
2 =− ww LL
0)()( 121 >+−−− −
−−
wLLTT wb βαβ
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We use to substitute , signal the maximum of shock factor
_
2
wL *2 )(
wL θ as ，so the shadow 
price can be rewrote as 
−θ
2P = =∫
− −−−− −−− θ βα θεθφαμ
0 2
1
1 ),()()( dLLTT
wb μ− ∫
−
Φ+−−
−−−−θ α εθθα
0 1
1
1 ),()()( dLLTT
wb     （14） 
integrate by parts of（14）and we get 
),()()([ 1
1
12 εθθαμ α Φ+−−−=
−−−− wb LLTTP +      （15） ∫
−
+−−Φ
−−−−θ α θεθαμ
0 1
1
1 )()(),(
wb LLTTd
In this cross-stage strategy, the amount of land selling by peasants will grow at the first stage as 
long as the shadow price increases. To investigate the industrial upgrade scale ε  we can 
research on the influence of adverse employment shock on shadow price of land transfer. 
Derivate formula（15）with respect to ε  and we get 
∫
−
<+−−∂
Φ∂=∂
∂ −−−−θ α θε
εθ
ε 0 1
1
1
2 0)()(),( wb LLTTdP                       (16) 
In this calculation, we use the inequation 0),( ≤∂
Φ∂
ε
εθ and . And 
according to formula （11）and we get 
0)()(
_
1
1
1 >+−−
−−− θα wb LLTTd
                     1 1 2
2
0
b bT T P
Pε ε
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂ <                                     (17) 
Formula（17）demonstrated that as the increase on scale of industrial upgrade (the increase of ε ）
land voluntarily transferred will decrease，which lead to the recession of land to be centralized. In 
fact the logic of the result is quite simple: along with the industrial upgrade，the expected 
possibility of return to land is becoming higher, which leads to the growing labor devoted into 
land. The marginal return of agricultural labor decreases as long as the relative marginal return of 
transferred land decreases，which means the shadow price of transferred land at the first period is 
decreasing. To balance the marginal land return of the two stages，peasants will reduce the transfer 
of land.  
One solution to release the difficulty of land centralization is to establish clear right of land 
transfer by which reduces the cost in the land transfer and incentive the peasants to transfer land. 
So under the same circumstance of adverse employment shock, if the right of land transfer 
becomes clear, maybe the motivation will be inspired. According to formula (10) and Implicit 
Function Theorem, we get  
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0
)())()(1(
1
1
2
1
2
1 >
−−+
−=∂
∂
−− βαααμ fbb
b
LTTc
T                             （
inequation c
18）   
The omes from . Above all，we can abstract the proposition to be test: 
roposition 3: When the adverse employment shock on peasants during the industrial 
3.2 Land Cooperation 
As a new way to centralize the land, the form of land cooperation is developing fast to bloom in 
agricultural production 
fu
02 <−αα
 
P
upgrade exists，there is a higher possibility that peasants are forced to return to the rural 
land. If this be predicted, their motivation of transferring land in the form of one-off 
compensation will be weaken, which makes the centralization of land become much harder. 
A more clear right of land transfer will release this pressure. 
the areas such as Suzhou. It springs up in the process of peasants gathering and land centralization. 
Currently its purpose are mainly in two parts, first it centralizes land and rents them by batch to 
industrial and city sections. Even the peasants are collecting money to build standard factories, 
renting the dormitory and sharing the rent profits. Second purpose is to developing agriculture in 
larger scale. The former one plays a more obvious influence on adverse shock. But we base on the 
latter one to elaborate the mitigation of adverse shock by land cooperation 
Assume the production function of cooperate cooperatives is the former 
nction, just newly put in the technology improvement factor as labor amplified A>1 to represent 
the advantage of production in large-scale in utilizing the production equipment .Assume N of 
peasants in a village organized a land cooperation, with the same production factor endowment. So 
for the peasant Ni∈ , the labor amount he owns is −L ，land amount is −T , the agriculture 
production functi e same as set above, the wage of e ployees in the indu ial section is w，
the production function of land cooperation is βα )()(),( ∑∑= N iN i LATLTG . For peasant i ， e 
β* gggg
g
on is th m str
11 == ii
production function he faced is * gg ALLNATTNLTG +−+−= ong 
which
th
α ])1([])1[(),( ，am
T  and represent the land amount and labor amount peasant put into the 
n r vely
gL
coopera espec ， *g
i
tio ti T and *gL  represent the optimal land amount and ptimal labor  o
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amount devoted by peasan j, j ∈ and its N j ≠ . Peasants’ income from the cooperation is 
endogenous, the wage gw  and harestock s  gr  depend on the marginal output of the land 
amount and labor amount hich are respectively  below , w  as
1** ])1([])1[( −+−=∂=
αβ gggg NATTNALw
−+∂ βgg ALLG               （19） 
βαα ])1([])1[( *1* gggggg ALLNATTNT
Gr +−+−=∂
∂= −                 （20）    
one of the advantages of land cooperation is it can smoothly avoid the 
elf-cultivated l
difficulty in centralization 
of the land under the adverse shock. It can be proofed that when N  of peasants are in the 
equilibrium situation and 1NA ，the marginal income curve of labor of the cooperation is 
always higher than that of s and（except for when 0
1 >−+βαβ
=L ）. Beside, since 1>A  and 
1≥N ，the condition is surely satisfied. Give  under the form llocation, th inal 
me as that of self-cultivated land and cooperatives land. Thus, it will gain more 
income to keep putting labor into cooperation than into self-cultivated land. That is why peasants 
are now putting surplus labor into the cooperation continuously until marginal rent of the 
cooperatives equals to the marginal income of the land. In other words, if an adverse employment 
shock takes place, peasants will increase the land being centralized. This insight also makes us 
avoid to consider the cross-period adverse shock but only consider the influence by the exogenous 
variable. 
Accordi
n
income is the sa
ng to the assumption above, the optimal problem is: 
wβα                       
    s.t     
er optimal a e marg
ggggwff
LLLTT
LrTwLLTMax
gwfgf
+++=π )()(
,,,,
 
−=+ TTT gf ； −=++ LLLL gwf       ) 
At last w hether ne ary to discuss th
     
（29） 
                     (21
e may find out w cess e corner solution because Lagrangian 
Solution is the overall optimal solution. When the Lagrangian Multiplier is strictly positive, we do 
not need to discuss the corner solution. Then we get 5 first—order conditions (27) to (31) 
(see appendix 2). Since all the peasants in the cooperation are the same, the allocations of their 
endowments are affirmatively symmetrical when it is in equilibrium. Use gg TL , to replace all 
the ** , gg TL  in the optimal condition to simplify（28）and（31）in appen mbine （27） 
and as well as （28）and （31）, and we get the following equation respectively 
dix. Co
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21λα =f
fL                                           （
λβT
22）   
                    
2
1
λ
λ
β
α =g
g
T
L                                           （23） 
From conclusion vat d (22) and（23）, we can get the that the land /labor proportion in the self-culti e  
land and the cooperation should be the same, as :  
                        
g
g
f
f
T
L
T
L =                                             （24）
le t
which is to say the voluntarily proportion of each peasant is
What we concerned most is the sca of land to be centralized through the form of coopera ion, 
f
g
T
T
. According to formula (29) and 
(31) in appendix 2, we can get the optimal land allocation proportion Λ  as 
1
11 −+βαT g            
2 ])1(
[ −+ −++==Λ βαβ βαNNAT f                （25） 
（see appendix 3）.Since at least equals 1,  formula（25） is strictly positive, which means the N
land of cooperation from the peasants never equals zero, that is why this Lagrangy Solution is the 
overall optimal solution. The result also manifests that the cooperation have enhanced the welfare 
of peasants. From formula （25） we can see when Λ  increases along with the growth of A . It 
means peasants are more willing to put land into t e cooperation with the larger techn gy 
improvement with more positive impact on output. The reason why the cooperation can work is 
that it guarantees the land centralization and increases the living level of peasants simultaneously. 
One of the key factors to increase the productivity of cooperation is to make it adapt to the 
large-scale agriculture production. Besides we can prove that when 02 >−
h olo
++ βαN , Λwill 
grow with the increase of N . When 02 <−++ βαN ，Λwill  
N . However, since 10 <<
decrease with the incre se ofa
+ βα ， ，the impact of the amount of 
peration members  land proporti  is negative. But N equals 1 means the 
cooperatives does not exist， Ignore the condition when N  equals 1， w ich means along with 
the increase of N ，
only when N equals 1
coo  on individual on
h
Λ  definitely rises. As same as the in easing amount of peasants joining in 
the land share c era n, the amount of land devoted will increase too. In fact, we can proof that 
no matter Λ  rises or falls , with the increase of the members，the total amount of land centralized 
is continuously growing (demonstrated in appendix 4). However, N  is hard to cover all the 
cr
oop tio
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peasants in the whole village, since mass production through land cooperation requires for 
transaction cost, and the free-ride problem is common in a team. That’ why an optimal level of 
N  exists, and we can also expect that along with the development of cooperation, an 
epreneur who handle the right of residual control will come up inside the members to 
supervise. Except for the management cost during the production process, the operation of 
measurement of land , the rent of field , distribution of profits ask for a relatively higher 
coordinate cost in the process of establishment and expansion of the cooperation. Ordinary 
peasants are hard to afford the high cost. In reality, the village as a basic level of government 
organization (not a government in a strict sense) is operating as a Reputation Institution existing 
inside the cooperatives to some extent. It can cut down the coordinate cost in a reasonable 
operation. In the rural areas in south Jiangsu Province，various kinds of cooperatives are usually 
organized and lead by the village group . Thus, we finally come to the last proposition: 
 
entr
Proposition 4: When the adverse employment shock on peasants exists during industrial 
4．Conclusion 
Through theoretical demonstration on the latent relationship between the industrial upgrade and 
upgrade, the land share cooperation can avoid the impact in the process of land 
centralization and enhance the welfare of members. The peasants will show higher 
enthusiasm to invest in lands with the more apparent technology improvement of the 
cooperation. Meanwhile, the increase of member amount can enhance the enthusiasm of 
single member, which bring up the total amount of land inside the cooperation. The member 
amount depends on the transaction cost of the organization. 
 
the mid-aged return to land phenomenon, we have come to the conclusion that, when peasants 
expect the relatively higher possibility of losing job, they will cut down the land transfer through 
one-off compensation by which prohibits the industrial upgrade relying on land acquisition and 
the coming urbanization. But the cultivated system of land share cooperation look after both sides 
of efficiency and fair，and is beneficial to realize the centralization of land.  
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The conclusion manifested the practice of economic developed districts such as Suzhou in the 
fo
cally, the analysis and conclusion of this paper has expanded the knowledge of how the 
tra
 
to the above proposition. Since it is not 
lo
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According to the definition of f (*), the denominator of Formula（32）is no greater than 0. Since 
，the second item in the brackets of numerator is 0.  So we can rewrite the item
brackets as 
0" =a s in the 
2
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(*))]([
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aP
PPPtaf − . According to the assumption of the property of the 
function (*)P , we get 02'" (*)][(*)(*) PPP − ≤ . In a more apparent way，we may first equal th
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e 
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'
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P
P is posi
gativ e increment of price is p
tive or negative. Since the increment of marginal 
price is ne e while th ositive, turn out to be the same result as 
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≤P .Therefore, along with the property of function of and we getf 0≥∂
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Use Lagrange on as below   
Appendix 2： 
’s theorem to formula（21） and we get a first –order conditi :
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） and we get： Use the simplified formula（29）to divide formula（31
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Appendix 4： 
We make an informal proof to standardize the amount of self-cultivated land of each member as 1, 
mount of invested land in the cooperation by each member is so the a
!
1
2 )1(−+ −++βαβ βαNNA ][
−+βα  . Let1 x=−+ 1βα  and according to the condition, it is 
demonstrated that 10 << x . So the total amount of land inside the cooperation is 
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it means that along with the increase of members inside the Land cooperation, the tal amount of 
centralized land will grow too. □. 
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